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DEBATE 
THE ARGUMENT FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, in which a federal district court held 
California’s ban on same-sex marriages unconstitutional, is set for 
expedited review in the Ninth Circuit; many argue that the case will 
ultimately be decided by the Supreme Court.  The arguments for and 
against the constitutionality of such statutes are thus at a fever pitch.  
In an article published earlier this year, Professors Nelson Tebbe and 
Deborah Widiss argued that marriage rights are best conceived of as 
an issue of equal access, rather than one of equal protection or 
substantive due process.  Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal 
Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1377 (2010). 
In The Argument for Same-Sex Marriage, Professors Tebbe and 
Widiss revisit the arguments they made in Equal Access and the Right to 
Marry and emphasize their belief that distinguishing between 
different-sex marriage and same-sex marriage is inappropriate.  They 
lament the sustained emphasis on the equal-protection and substantive-
due-process challenges in the Perry litigation and suggest that an equal-
access approach is more likely to be successful on appeal. 
Professor Shannon Gilreath questions some of the 
fundamental premises for same-sex marriage in Arguing Against 
Arguing for Marriage.  He challenges proponents to truly reflect on 
“what there is to commend marriage to Gay people,” and points to his 
own reversal on the question as evidence.  Though he stands fully in 
opposition to critics of same-sex marriage who use the stance to veil 
attacks on equality generally, Gilreath argues that marriage can be 
seen as a further institutionalization of gays and lesbians that risks 
“assimilationist erasure of Gay identity.”  Gilreath concludes by noting 
that to the extent that marriage is assumed to be normatively good, 
the Tebbe-Widiss equal access approach to same-sex marriage 
recognition may be the most successful; still, he invites those on all 
sides of the debate to vigorously challenge that assumption.  
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OPENING STATEMENT 
The Right Way to Argue for the Right to Marry 
Nelson Tebbe† and Deborah A. Widiss†† 
How should courts think about the right to marry?  This is a 
question of principle, of course, but it is also a key question of 
litigation strategy.  In August, district court Judge Vaughn Walker held 
California’s ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional.  Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, No. 09-2292, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78817, at *217 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2010).  The Ninth Circuit has announced that it will 
hear the appeal on an expedited basis; it is widely expected that the 
Supreme Court will ultimately decide the case.  It is therefore 
especially important right now to craft arguments that can appeal to 
moderate judges. 
David Boies and Ted Olsen, who surprised the legal world when 
they teamed up to bring the case, are extremely skilled lawyers.  They 
built a very strong factual record in Perry, and they deserve credit for 
winning a big victory in the trial court.  But we believe that the legal 
arguments they have been emphasizing, and which serve as the basis 
for the trial court decision, are vulnerable on appeal.  In an article 
published earlier this year in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
we argued the right to marry is best conceived as a matter of “equal 
access” to government support and recognition, and that the best 
doctrinal vehicle for that conception is the fundamental-interest 
branch of equal protection law.  Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, 
Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1377 
(2010).  Our approach offers a sensible, moderate way for judges to 
strike down bans on same-sex couples’ marriage rights and a more 
satisfying way to conceptualize the right to marriage generally. 
I.  CIVIL MARRIAGE AND DUE PROCESS 
Two other arguments have been the focus of the California 
litigation, as well as prior challenges of other state provisions limiting 
marriage to different-sex couples.  The first is that everyone has a due 
process right to get married in a state-recognized ceremony.  This 
claim relies on precedents, like Loving v. Virginia, 318 U.S. 1 (1967), in 
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which the Supreme Court has referred to marriage as “fundamental.”  
Judge Walker found a due process violation in the California case, but 
almost every other federal and state court addressing the issue has 
rejected this claim.  Those courts have concluded that “marriage” is 
“deeply rooted” in American “history and traditions” under the 
traditional due process test, but that “same-sex marriage” is not.  
Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 9 (N.Y. 2006) (quoting Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997)). 
We disagree with the line that courts draw between “marriage” 
and “same-sex marriage.”  If there is a due process right to marriage, it 
should be understood as a fundamental right to choose one’s 
spouse—a freedom that same-sex couples should share.  But we see a 
deeper flaw with this argument:  there may be no due process right to 
civil marriage at all, even for different-sex couples.  The cases typically 
cited to support a due process-protected right to marry link marriage 
to a due process-protected interest in procreation.  See, e.g., Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. 
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).  While this link may have made 
some sense in an earlier era when many state laws made marriage a 
prerequisite to legal childbearing, today having children outside 
marriage is accepted, both socially and legally. 
In fact, civil marriage—that is, a marriage that meets state law 
requirements and thus is recognized by the state—is different from 
other family-related rights, such as the right to make choices 
regarding child rearing, sexual intimacy, contraceptive use, or 
termination of a pregnancy.  These other rights can be exercised 
without any state involvement, and due process protects against 
burdensome government regulations that could unduly limit 
individual choices.  Civil marriage, by contrast, is a government 
program that provides both material and expressive benefits and 
imposes certain obligations.  In this respect, civil marriage is also 
different from private or religious marriage.  Civil marriage requires 
government sanction—a marriage license—while private or religious 
marriage does not. 
To see this more clearly, imagine a state that chose to abolish civil 
marriage altogether, leaving marriage to religious groups or other 
private organizations.  Although state and federal courts assert that 
marriage is “unquestionably” a fundamental right, they also 
sometimes suggest that states could simply stop performing marriages.  
Commentators sometimes propose this as a “solution” to the same-sex 
marriage debate.  Dorian Solot & Marshall Miller, Taking Government 
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Out of the Marriage Business, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS 70, 71 (Anita 
Bernstein ed., 2006); Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2006).  Such a state could decide to 
offer civil unions or domestic partnerships.  Or it could designate 
some other form of family relationship, such as the parent-child 
relationship, as the basis for government benefits or recognition.  
While these reforms are probably not politically viable, we agree with 
other scholars who have concluded that they would not violate any 
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No 
Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27, 40-43 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, The 
Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2083 (2005).  Yet getting out 
of the marriage business would impose the maximum possible burden 
on access to civil marriage.  If the Due Process Clause really did 
guarantee a right to marry civilly, a law ending civil marriage would 
almost certainly be unconstitutional.  This helps illustrate the 
weakness in the due process argument:  a right to enter a private or 
religious marriage may indeed be protected by due process, but a 
right to civil marriage is likely not. 
II.  CLASSIFICATION-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 
The second argument emphasized in the California litigation, and 
other similar challenges, is that all government distinctions on the 
basis of sexual orientation should be subject to heightened scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause.  This approach has had some 
success.  Several state supreme courts have held that classifications on 
the basis of sexual orientation are presumptively unconstitutional and 
have, under this more rigorous standard, struck down state laws that 
exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage.  Moreover, in the Perry 
case, the trial court held that the proponents of Proposition 8 had 
failed to establish that there was even a rational basis for the law.  This 
was likewise true in Massachusetts.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 
798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003).  However, courts in several states 
have held that classifications on the basis of sexual orientation do not 
raise special concerns and therefore do not prompt any presumption 
of invalidity.  Courts in New York, Washington, Maryland, Indiana, 
and Arizona have all upheld different-sex marriage laws under 
ordinary scrutiny, as have several lower federal courts. 
We agree that there is probably not even a rational basis for bans 
on same-sex marriage.  The primary justification offered in litigation 
today—that legislatures may limit marriage to different-sex couples 
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because they are the only ones who may accidentally procreate and 
thus need to be encouraged to form stable families—strikes us, and 
many others, as far-fetched.  We also agree that classifications on the 
basis of sexual orientation should be presumptively suspect.  But there 
is a widespread sense that the Supreme Court is unlikely to announce 
a new suspect class comprised of gay men and lesbians.  Indeed, the 
Court may be moving away from the tiers of scrutiny framework 
altogether.  And while there are instances in which the Supreme 
Court has been willing to strike down laws even under the rational 
basis standard, see, for example, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 
(1996), courts generally are quite deferential to legislative judgments.  
As a practical matter, therefore, a classification-based equal protection 
argument may be unlikely to succeed in higher federal court or in 
many state courts. 
III.  EQUAL ACCESS 
Equal access holds that, once conferred, the right to marry in a 
legally recognized ceremony is fundamental.  In other words, if a 
government decides to recognize and support civil marriage, it cannot 
exclude same-sex couples without providing an adequate justification.  
There is a particular harm when the material and expressive benefits 
of a fundamentally important government institution, such as civil 
marriage, are not extended evenhandedly.  This approach differs 
from both the due process theory and the classification-based equal 
protection theory.  It recognizes a harm may exist even if the relevant 
conduct is not protected by due process and even if the exclusion is 
not based on a suspect classification.  Independent analysis is required 
to determine whether a different-sex marriage requirement violates 
equal access. 
Even though our approach has been sidelined in same-sex 
marriage cases, equal access is well grounded in longstanding case law.  
In fact, the Supreme Court has already applied this reasoning to 
marriage itself.  In an important decision, the Court  struck down a 
Wisconsin law that prohibited parents who owed child support from 
marrying.  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 389-91 (1978).  It 
concluded that access to civil marriage was too important to exclude 
people simply because they couldn’t pay.  Although the Court 
referred to the full range of precedents that spoke to the fundamental 
importance of marriage, the decision was ultimately grounded 
squarely in equal protection.  Id.  Strict scrutiny was applied not 
because singling out scofflaw fathers was particularly suspect, nor even 
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because the law placed a particularly heavy burden on poor people, 
but instead because the government differentiation impacted a 
fundamentally important institution, civil marriage. 
The Court has applied similar reasoning in other areas of law as 
well.  For example, the Justices struck down the poll tax on an equal 
access theory.  Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).  
States are not constitutionally required to establish elections at all—
but if they decide to do so, voters cannot be turned away simply 
because they are poor.  Id.  Another example concerns access to 
courts.  The Constitution does not require states to administer appeals 
from criminal convictions—but if they decide to do so, they generally 
must ensure that poor defendants are not shut out because of court 
costs.  Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-57 (1963).  Neither due 
process nor equal protection alone can wholly explain the result in 
these cases—instead, the overlapping interests at play deserve special 
consideration.  See Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and 
the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 
(2002) (proposing that looking “stereoscopically” through the lenses 
of equal protection and due process can have synergistic effects).  
Civil marriage is similar:  because of its fundamental importance, 
selective exclusion from legal marriage should be unconstitutional in 
most situations. 
This equal access theory captures the most important 
constitutional considerations surrounding same-sex marriage.  It 
recognizes that access to civil marriage is partly about liberty—here, 
the ability of individuals to choose a spouse and to form a legally 
recognized family—and that it is partly about a type of equality—
namely, the right to be free from governmental discrimination.  It 
combines considerations of liberty and equality in a way that matches 
the harm that many couples feel.  Moreover, equal access is both 
backward- and forward-looking.  On the one hand, it recognizes that 
civil marriage has played an important role in American history and 
traditions.  On the other hand, however, it challenges the way that 
many officials have drawn lines around that institution—and in that way 
it looks to the future, like the best of American equal protection laws. 
Importantly, a decision on equal access grounds would only 
concern civil marriage.  Religious congregations would remain free to 
determine who could marry in accordance with their own precepts.  
Nor would it commit the Court to a rule that the government could 
not differentiate on the basis of sexual orientation in other contexts, 
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such as the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy.  And finally, 
under our approach, states could also decide to simply stop providing 
civil marriages at all—moving instead, for example, to a system of civil 
unions for all couples, gay and straight.  Constitutional problems arise 
only when states selectively deny access to marriage. 
In short, equal access offers real, practical advantages over the 
arguments that have dominated earlier litigation.  It stands a better 
chance of success in the Ninth Circuit and in the Supreme Court—
and it better reflects our longstanding commitment to ensuring equal 
access to fundamentally important government programs. 
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REBUTTAL 
Arguing Against Arguing for Marriage 
Shannon Gilreath† 
 
In an earlier, well-written article, Professors Nelson Tebbe and 
Deborah Widiss urged Gay advocates to pursue an “equal access” 
argument, which they believe could be effective in securing marriage 
for Gays and Lesbians.  Tebbe & Widiss, supra, at 1377.  In the 
Opening Statement of this Debate, they reiterate their argument in 
light of the recent decision in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, which declared 
unconstitutional California’s ban on same-sex marriage.  No. 09-2292, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78817, at *217 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2010).  Tebbe 
and Widiss do not wish to quibble with Judge Walker’s conclusions in 
Perry that marriage is a fundamental right and that a differentiated 
system of partnership recognition for Gays and straights violates equal 
protection.  Instead, taking issue with the durability of Judge Walker’s 
analysis on appeal, they offer an eminently practical, alternative 
analysis they believe would be more likely to survive legal challenge.  
Their approach is not grounded in equal protection, thus not 
engaging the problematic classification-based framework at the core 
of the Supreme Court’s current (and flawed) conceptualization of 
equality.  Nevertheless, their equal access approach advances equality 
(at least by the formal definition).  Their contribution to the 
conversation on litigation strategy, therefore, is one to which pro-
marriage advocates might do well to listen.  Surely, it fits nicely within 
the current liberal discourse on same-sex marriage, assuming as it 
does that marriage is normatively good, and strategizing ways to get 
Gays into it. 
But for me to participate in this Debate on my own terms, I have 
to begin at a prior point in the discourse altogether, asking what there 
is to commend marriage to Gay people.  In other words, I’m asking to 
what are we trying to get “equal access,” exactly.  Those readers 
                                                          
† Professor for the Interdisciplinary Study of Law & Professor of Women’s and 
Gender Studies, Wake Forest University. 
 As is my convention, I capitalize Gay and Lesbian to emphasize the social and 
political identities the terms connote.  For the sake of brevity, unless otherwise 
specified, the term “Gay” used alone is meant to be inclusive of Gay men and Lesbians. 
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familiar with my previous work bearing on the marriage controversy 
may receive this announcement with some surprise.  See SHANNON 
GILREATH, SEXUAL POLITICS:  THE GAY PERSON IN AMERICA TODAY 139-
40 (2006) (identifying Gay marriage as a “way to advance gay rights in 
a way no other action can”).  Some of the “sweetness” (for lack of a 
better descriptor) of my discussion of marriage there has been 
replaced by a deeper understanding of the reality of Gay people’s 
lives.  But I believe the following is entirely consistent with my prior 
work to the extent that my criticism of the Gay rights movement’s 
current obsessive focus on marriage is not a criticism of the pursuit of 
equal rights. 
I still believe that Gays are entitled to the same rights as straights 
when it comes to tax treatment, rights of access to children, or access 
to one’s partner in times of ill health or other crises.  The impulse 
towards these legal rights is completely understandable.  This is also 
not an attack on the argument that the Constitution guarantees 
marriage for Gays in every sense, including, probably, the word 
“marriage.”  Thus, the reader should not confuse my argument here 
as commensurate with the current religionist assault on Gay equality 
in the name of marriage.  I stand firmly against it.  Shannon Gilreath, 
Not a Moral Issue:  Same Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 205, 209-214 (2010).  Nevertheless, I think the millions of dollars 
(not to mention the emotional cost) invested in the ongoing fight 
over the word “marriage” in California is a tragic waste.  And I think 
the general shift in strategy from the pursuit of equal legal rights and 
status to litigation over a word is liberalism run amok. 
I would also like to note that the utter practicality of the Tebbe 
and Widiss analysis leaves me nonplussed.  Their equal access 
argument short-circuits the larger equality question.  I have been 
saying for some time that Gays would be better off if equal protection 
were reconceptualized.  Shannon Gilreath, Some Penetrating 
Observations on the Fifth Anniversary of Lawrence v. Texas: Privacy, 
Dominance, and Substantive Equality Theory, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 
442, 459 (2009) [hereinafter Substantive Equality].  But this discussion 
cannot be had if Gay advocates abandon the equality dialogue, in the 
way that Tebbe and Widiss do, in favor of the path of least resistance 
to marriage.  This strategy privileges marriage over everything else and 
discriminates against those among us who, for whatever reason, are not 
rushing to the altar. 
But because the Perry decision and Tebbe and Widiss focus on 
marriage per se, I will bracket that discussion and concentrate instead 
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on a Gay liberation analysis of marriage as an end goal.  I elaborate 
two major points about marriage and the Gay rights movement’s 
pursuit of it:  (1) marriage is dangerous for Gays conceptually, in its 
patriarchal and heteroarchical foundations, and as a furtherance of 
an alarming movement toward assimilationist erasure of Gay identity 
and community; and (2) marriage is dangerous to Gays physically.  As 
will become clear, my ground for this critique is not liberalism, but 
Gay liberationism—much influenced by the liberationist 
understandings that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, which were 
linked to women’s liberation and to the early Gay movement’s 
acknowledgement of the importance of destroying gender 
conventions and disestablishing the family. 
I. MARRIAGE AND HETERONORMATIVITY AS ERASURE  
(CONCEPTUAL/EXISTENTIAL VIOLENCE) 
In 2004, Professor Katherine Franke presciently warned of an 
increasing domestication of Gay rights in the wake of Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), with a view toward the normative project 
Lawrence galvanized, namely marriage. Katherine M. Franke, The 
Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 
1407-09 (2004).  Like Franke, I am alarmed by Lawrence’s removal of 
the Gay litigants into the heteronormative project of monogamous, 
familial coupling.  This follows the “like-straight” logic of the Gay 
groups that intervened in the case as amici, principally asking the 
Court to extend the presumptive value of heterosexual sexual 
relationships to Gay sexual relationships that, according to the Gay 
amici, are like straight relationships in every way.  See Gilreath, 
Substantive Equality, supra, at 448-58 (noting that the Lawrence Court and 
Gay amici advocated an assimilationist approach in which “equality is 
defined in terms of equivalence to the heteronormative standard”). 
The Lawrence majority thus transformed what, for all we really 
know, was sex between friends or simply no-strings-attached sex into a 
relationship in the romanticized, straight tradition, which made the 
sex acceptable.  In other words, the domesticity of the sex involved—
indeed, the Lawrence majority’s compulsory domestication of 
Lawrence and Garner—sufficiently inoculated the Gay-ness of 
Lawrence and Garner’s claim to sexual liberty by replacing it with a 
claim for relationship-based intimacy.  What is most important here is 
that by domesticating the sex in Lawrence, indeed one might say by 
disappearing it, the majority accomplished the domestication and 
2010] Same-Sex Marriage 31 
 
disappearance of the Gay men involved, assimilating them into the 
relationship-oriented model on which patriarchy rests.  Having 
established this as the normative framework for arguing for Gay rights, 
Lawrence thus catalyzed the marriage craze.  Lawrence dangled the bait, 
signaling that marriage was the door to acceptance and legal 
protection through heteronormative assimilation (while explicitly 
disavowing it as such), and Gays swallowed it.  Goodridge v. Department 
of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), followed, and ultimately, 
so did Perry. 
The result of Lawrence and the marriage model has been the 
transfiguration of Gay liberation into the universalities of “Gay 
Rights.”  The metaphysics of formal equality transfigures marriage, the 
institution, into the gateway to ontic happiness and freedom.  This is 
paradoxical considering that the history of Gay identity is one of 
institutionalization as a means to essentialize and ultimately erase us.  
Our first institution was the psychiatric ward, where we, medicalized as 
psychotics, were electroshocked, lobotomized, and murdered.  See 
generally SHANNON GILREATH, SEXUAL IDENTITY LAW IN CONTEXT: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 141-48 (2007).  Then we were criminalized and 
institutionalized in the prison.  Having only recently emerged, we rush 
to marriage for its value as an institution.  This is what, according to 
Judge Walker, equality demands; it is what Tebbe and Widiss say we 
are entitled to access; and it is a reversal that perhaps only Foucault 
could really appreciate. 
Consider the politics of marriage expounded by Marriage Equality 
California and Lambda: 
[There] is no other way for gay people to be fully equal to non-gay 
people—both in the eyes of the law, and in the eyes of the larger 
community—than to participate in the same legal institution using the 
same language. . . . Any alternative to marriage is not marriage.  
Anything less, is less than equal! 
Franke, supra, at 1415 (quoting Marriage Equality California & 
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Roadmap to Equality:  A 
Freedom to Marry Educational Guide (2002) (no longer available 
online)) (emphasis omitted).  We see that, unlike the first two phases 
of institutionalization, in which Gays who were demonstratively non-
normative (either because they were caught, self-identified, or could 
not otherwise hide their sexual orientation) were medicalized and 
criminalized, it is non-normative Gays—those who do not acquiesce in 
patriarchal notions of monogamous coupling and childrearing—who 
are said to fail to appreciate the good of institutionalization in the 
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form of marriage.  It is also the non-normative Gays who, by virtue of 
their dissent, are pushed outside the ever-shrinking Gay political 
universe.  This is the political project that finds its voice in cultural 
criticism from the likes of Bruce Bawer and Andrew Sullivan, see 
BRUCE BAWER, A PLACE AT THE TABLE:  THE GAY INDIVIDUAL IN 
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1993); ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL:  
AN ARGUMENT ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY (1995), and in law from neo-
con-liberals like William Eskridge.  See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,, THE 
CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED 
COMMITMENT (1996).  Indeed, the politics and law of the Gay 
movement have become univocal in their supplication to straight 
power:  Look at me!  I’m like you!  Having thus set the parameters of 
Gay rights organizing, the leadership has narrowed the focus of 
community resources nearly exclusively to marriage. 
Relatedly, there is something even more disturbing about the case 
for marriage reflected in its propaganda.  Consider, again, the 
admonition that “[there] is no other way for gay people to be fully 
equal to non-gay people . . . than to participate in the same legal 
institution.”  Franke, supra, at 1415.  This reveals marriage as a safety 
strategy.  In other words, marriage is a way to legitimate behaviors 
otherwise illegitimate, a way of avoiding discrimination and second-
class citizenship and of achieving civic safety.  If Gay marriage boils 
down to a desperate attempt at assimilation in an effort to avoid the 
lethal attentions of heterosexuals, can we honestly talk about Gays 
entering marriage in anything resembling a condition of freedom?  In 
this realization, same-sex marriage—supposedly this new and game-
changing thing—looks a lot like old patriarchal marriage in which 
women “consented” to marriage as a way to achieve safety in a world 
that was nothing short of murderous for a woman without the “bonds 
of matrimony” as her shield.  When William Eskridge argues that 
marriage is a way for Gays to become “civilized,” I wonder if he wants 
Gays to be “civilized” in the same ways that women have been 
“civilized” by marriage.  ESKRIDGE, supra, at 8-13.  Institutionalization 
out of desperation hardly seems much like freedom to me.  Neither 
does becoming heterosexualized ghosts of ourselves. 
II.  MARRIAGE AND PHYSICAL VIOLENCE 
It is often noted that approximately fifty percent of heterosexual 
marriages end in divorce.  THE NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT AT THE UNIV. 
OF VA. & THE INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS, 
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MARRIAGE IN AMERICA, 2009:  MONEY & MARRIAGE 77 (2009), 
http://www.virginia.edu/marriageproject/annualreports.html.  It is 
less frequently remarked, certainly, that the other fifty percent 
probably should.  But despite the existence of no-fault divorce, the 
legal entanglement that is marriage is still difficult to escape.  
Economic dependence (which marriage encourages on the part of 
one spouse—most often the woman) and the presence of children, 
coupled with legal strictures that make exit difficult, often keep bad 
marriages intact.  This is most alarming because, for women, the 
marital home is often violent.  See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY 
THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 181867, EXTENT, NATURE, AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, at iii (2000), available 
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/181867.htm (noting that 
twenty-five percent of women were raped or physically assaulted by a 
current or former spouse or cohabitating partner). 
There is strong evidence suggesting that Gay relationships mirror 
the violence of their heterosexual counterparts.  Gay relationships are 
violent precisely because the only model Gays have for what a 
relationship should look like is the straight model.  The dominant 
structure of sexual inequality inherent in heterosexual marriages 
bleeds over into the Gay model, so that Gay relationships reaffirm 
those social conditions to the detriment of the people involved.  Some 
reports speculate that domestic violence among Gay men may occur at 
rates greater than those of domestic violence in the straight 
community.  One study indicated that 23.1% of cohabiting Gay men 
said they were raped or physically battered by a spouse or cohabiting 
partner at some time in their lives, compared to 7.7% of men 
cohabiting with opposite-sex partners.  L. KEVIN HAMBERGER & MARY 
BETH PHELAN, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SCREENING AND INTERVENTION IN 
MEDICAL AND MENTAL HEALTHCARE SETTINGS 301 (2004).  Another 
study showed that men who have sex with men are six times more 
likely to suffer an assault as an adult.  GILLIAN C. MEZEY & MICHAEL B. 
KING, MALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 9 (2d ed. 2000).  I think 
there are very important sociological reasons for this.  We inevitably 
strike out against the thing we are conditioned to hate.  In the case of 
cohabiting Gay men, that target is readily accessible in the home.  It is 
a form of internalized and then externalized queer bashing in the 
most intimate dimensions of the Gay community itself. 
Knowing what we know, do we really want to make our 
relationships harder to exit than we need to?  There is certainly no 
reason to believe that the legal entanglements of marriage would 
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affect battered Gays differently than they have affected battered 
women.  Recall that when one of Jeffery Dahmer’s victims escaped—
dazed, nearly naked, and understanding nearly no English—and 
made it to police, those police returned him to Dahmer, despite the 
fact that his head was obviously bleeding from Dahmer’s attempts to 
drill holes in his skull.  Reportedly, the officers joked that it was a 
lover’s spat.  Milwaukee Panel Finds Discrimination by Police, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 16, 1991, at B8, available at 1991 WLNR 3035625.  The obvious 
violence was somehow rendered consensual in the minds of these 
(ostensibly heterosexual) officers because it took place within the 
parameters of an assumed relationship.  Interesting how the officers 
made basically the same reductionistic assumptions about Gay men that 
the majority did in Lawrence. 
The anticommunitarian nature of marriage puts Gays at risk of 
violence from outside of our relationships, too.  One of the 
preconditions to violence is that the victim is usually alone and cut off 
from systems of support.  This is one reason that marriage has been so 
dangerous for women.  But the anticommunitarian nature of 
marriage may be even more dangerous for Gays because, historically, 
a woman has traded (sometimes violent) bondage to one man in 
marriage for safety from the danger of violence from many men if she 
were not married.  The respect of patriarchs for one another has 
generally meant some safety for women in marriage relative to the rest 
of the patriarchal world.  Not so for Gays.  Marriage, because it 
privatizes energies into the family unit, results in the dismantling of 
support systems found in the community.  When Gays recognize other 
Gays, we often say they are “family.”  The Gay liberation movement 
has abandoned this communitarian conception of family in favor of 
the heterosexualized, privatized, monogamous family model found in 
marriage. 
The marriage craze is also driven in large part by an emerging 
obsession by Gays with procreation—an enterprise that further 
privatizes energies.  Arguably, this retreat into the nuclear family unit 
leaves us even more vulnerable to outside attack, as political 
consciousness recedes in favor of the romanticized family ideal.  
Monogamy, definitionally, is the anticommunitarian privatization of 
sexual energies, and with those energies comes the privatization of the 
very sexual politics of community building.  Richard Mohr, notably, 
has argued that marriage ought to be reformed to allow for the often 
open, communitarian nature of Gay multipartner relationships.  
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Richard D. Mohr, Essay, The Case for Gay Marriage, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 215, 233 (1995).  But there seems to be no 
interest on the part of the Gay leadership in pursuing this path 
instead of the fetishized, heterosexual ideal.  In the closed, like-
straight liberal universe, anything not approximating the (fictionally) 
monogamous heterosexual union is valueless.  Consequently, since 
there is no special safety in Gay marriage in the same way that it is 
built into the heterosexual marriage racket for the preservation of 
patriarchy, marriage leaves us more vulnerable to outside violence. 
CONCLUSION 
I have likely taken the question presented by the “right way to 
argue for the right to marry” in an unexpected and unwanted 
direction.  Most liberals are not interested in a discussion of marriage 
that does not make that most-heterosexual of presumptions that 
marriage is a priori good.  I was struck recently when rereading “The 
Speech of Aristophanes” from Plato’s Symposium—that antique 
defense of same-sex love still widely regarded as the best exposition of 
the self-actualizing and legitimating power of Gay relationships—that 
marriage nowhere figured.  PLATO, THE SYMPOSIUM 22-27 (M.C. 
Howatson & Frisbee C.C. Sheffield, eds., M.C. Howatson, trans., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2008).  Maybe the Gay rights movement’s 
leadership and the lawyers who theorize to support them could use a 
refresher course in the classics.  Otherwise, I fear that when the 
history of the Gay movement itself is written it will read more as 
epitaph than epilogue:  Once upon a time there was a Movement . . . 
then there was Marriage. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Nelson Tebbe and Deborah A. Widiss 
On the whole, Professor Gilreath does not take issue with our 
argument that, given existing law and the full range of practical 
contingencies, equal access presents the best approach for securing 
access to civil marriage for gay and lesbian couples.  He tells pro-
marriage advocates that our proposal is worth heeding. 
Instead of directly engaging with our project, he uses the occasion 
of this Debate to argue that advocates for gay and lesbian rights have 
erred in deciding to pursue (or go along with) a campaign for 
marriage equality.  Professor Gilreath claims that marriage is 
unattractive conceptually because it has unavoidable heteronormative 
implications, and that it is a troubling goal practically because it 
brings an increased risk of trapping gay men and lesbian women in 
physically abusive relationships.   
Professor Gilreath is not alone in questioning whether gays and 
lesbians should seek the right to marry.  Rather, as Nancy Polikoff 
explores in detail in a recent book, this has long been a point of 
debate within the gay and lesbian community.  NANCY D. POLIKOFF, 
BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:  VALUING ALL FAMILIES 
UNDER THE LAW 28 (2008).  Some commentators and advocates, like 
Professor Gilreath, have been concerned that seeking marriage is 
harmful because it accepts the status quo privilege awarded to 
marriage and could undermine more egalitarian aspects of gay and 
lesbian relationships.  Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage the 
Path to Liberation?, in LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE:  PRIVATE 
COMMITMENTS, PUBLIC CEREMONIES 20-21 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 
1992); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For:  Why Legalizing 
Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender 
in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1549 (1993).  Other prominent 
voices within the gay and lesbian community have argued, by contrast, 
that permitting same-sex couples to marry is not only a necessary 
component of achieving true equality and securing important 
practical benefits, but would also have the separate advantage of 
helping undermine gender norms within marriage more generally.  
Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People Should Seek the Right to Marry, in 
LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE, supra, at 13, 19; Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, 
Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 9, 17 (1991). 
Our reply is simply that we have not taken a position on the broad 
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question of whether marriage, either private or civil, is a worthy goal 
for advocates of gay and lesbian rights.  Tebbe & Widiss, supra, at 1405 
n.134.  We have our own reactions to Professor Gilreath’s points, of 
course, but they are generally irrelevant to our equal access proposal.  
We take as a given that at least some members of the gay and lesbian 
community would like to marry in a civil ceremony and that they have 
decided to bring litigation designed to win them that right.  Our 
argument addresses those individuals, the lawyers and organizations 
that represent and support them, and the judges who may decide 
their cases.  We believe that equal access offers the best pathway to 
legal success. 
Professor Gilreath’s Rebuttal may have one challenging 
implication for our argument, although he does not fully develop it.  
If civil marriage is not an institution that is or should be important to 
gay and lesbian couples, then our claim that civil marriage is 
“fundamental,” as that term is used in cases within the fundamental 
interest branch of equal protection law, could seem weaker.  Three 
responses occur to us.  First, whether an institution or activity is 
fundamentally important is a matter of social meaning, not individual 
perspective or opinion.  And as a matter of social meaning, it seems to 
us that civil marriage is indeed central to American law and society.  
Id. at 1415-16.  Second, the Supreme Court itself has often said that 
marriage is “fundamental,” albeit sometimes in passing or in dicta.  See 
id. at 1388-91.  Finally, members of the gay and lesbian community 
who are advocating for equal access to civil marriage have imbued 
their own arguments with the force of passionate conviction.  One 
need only recall the moving scenes that have unfolded on courthouse 
steps or outside legislative chambers in states where couples have won 
official recognition of their commitment. 
We do disagree with a couple of minor points that Professor 
Gilreath makes about our proposal.  First, we do not believe that we 
have abandoned equality arguments.  As we make clear in our print 
article, one of the most attractive features of equal access is that it 
combines liberty concerns with a strong commitment to 
evenhandedness.  Id. at 1421-24.  Moreover, we do not think our 
argument privileges marriage—it simply offers a strong argument for 
couples that wish to pursue access to civil marriage, possibly in 
combination with other goals that may be given higher priority.  In 
fact, one benefit of our approach is that a state could decide to 
abolish civil marriage for all couples, gay and straight, without 
violating constitutional principles.  Id. at 1405-06. 
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A day may come when advocates for gay and lesbian rights 
abandon the fight for marriage equality and move on to other goals.  
If that happens, our argument would lose some of its relevance, a 
development that would cause us no distress.  Until that time, 
however, we believe that our equal access approach has a valuable role 
to play in the ongoing debate. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Shannon Gilreath 
As Professors Tebbe and Widiss emphasize, I do not have a 
technical quarrel with their equal access strategy for litigating 
marriage.  They are, I suspect, right in suggesting that their proposal 
would make it easier for judges to decide in favor of Gay marriage (or 
to uphold it on appeal) than would asking them to engage equal 
protection squarely.  In my experience, if you give judges an 
opportunity to avoid making a legal decision based on equality—or the 
lack of it—they will take it, especially when Gay people are concerned. 
It is this overwhelming conceptual flaw in Tebbe and Widiss’s 
argument that makes it unnecessary for me to tinker with its 
technicalities.  Given the potential result of the argument’s 
application, its mechanics don’t much concern me.  What does 
concern me is what we might get if Tebbe and Widiss were to be 
successful:  marriage in its unaltered heteronormativity.  Tebbe and 
Widiss evidently consider my concerns in this regard to be something 
other than “directly engaging with [their] project.”  But any legal 
proposal that purports to advance a Gay cause—like the quest for 
marriage—is an invitation to think about the role the law plays in the 
future of Gay rights.  Thus, I think it is important to ask whether the 
result Tebbe and Widiss say they can produce via “equal access”—that 
is, access to marriage-- is a good thing for Gay liberation. 
Tebbe and Widiss say they take no position on the good or ill of 
marriage; rather they offer a strategy of access for those who want it.  
In this announcement they both miss my point and inadvertently 
reinforce it.  The Gay movement’s posture of not evaluating critically 
the meaning of marriage as a social institution and yet strategizing to 
access it is what I think makes the movement’s emphasis on marriage 
so frightening.*  Demanding that we engage in the kind of critical 
inquiry about marriage that I sketch in my Rebuttal is a big part of the 
                                                          
* Tebbe and Widiss point out that some such evaluation has taken place in the 
context of the debate over same-sex marriage, generally among academics.  I agree 
that the union of two people of the same sex, for whom, from the straight perspective, 
no gender inequity could be presumed, might do something to destabilize gender.  
I’m all for that.  But I think the costs of marriage, as explained in my Rebuttal, 
outweigh the likely benefits.  And, anyway, the same destabilizing effects on gender in 
coupling could be had via Gays coupling in visible ways that do not insist upon 
patriarchal constructions or labels.  Perhaps even greater destabilization could be 
achieved in this way. 
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social and legal project that is Gay liberation.  Gay liberation, by 
definition, is the effort to empower Gay people on Gay people’s terms.  
Thus a demand for access to marriage (such as the demand Tebbe 
and Widiss make) without a concomitant demand for change is of 
limited utility—and indeed may be dangerous—to Gay liberation.  
Straight society’s existing attitudes about what constitutes 
personhood, including marriage as a precondition to self-fulfillment, 
have never encompassed Gay experience.  We have never had access 
to their definitions on our terms.  Seeking access to marriage is the 
quintessence of seeking affirmation by straight people on their terms.  
And it is important for Gay people—after all, this is our legal and 
political struggle—to remember that Gay liberation never aspired to 
this kind of access.  If the movement, its leadership, and its lawyers 
have changed the mission in this very costly way, I think they owe it to 
the rest of us to explain why they think access to marriage is a good 
idea—not just how they plan on getting it. 
In closing, let me clarify my criticisms of the equal access 
argument that Tebbe and Widiss believe are direct but based on 
misapprehensions.  In their Closing Statement, Tebbe and Widiss say 
that their proposal has not “abandoned equality arguments.”  Indeed, 
the professors explain that, “one of the most attractive features of 
equal access is that it combines liberty arguments with a strong 
commitment to evenhandedness.”  But evenhandedness is not 
equality, except by the most formal definition.  Access to marriage 
advances equality to a degree, but it does not engage the more 
meaningful, substantive question of equality in terms of dominance 
and caste.  See Gilreath, Substantive Equality, supra, at 460 (proposing a 
substantive equality approach in which courts ask “whether the law 
promoted the dominance of one group with the consequence of 
subordination of the target group”). 
Tebbe and Widdis confessedly write for the many Gay rights 
advocates who seem to believe that marriage is a panacea.  It isn’t.  In 
fact, granting access to marriage based on arguments other than 
substantive equality may create a roadblock to future legal and social 
gains.  If we get marriage, the likely result will be that straight people 
will say:  “Look what we gave you.  What more do you want?”  My fear 
is that the Gay leadership, having demonstrated a myopic obsession 
with marriage at the expense of nearly everything else, might respond:  
“Very little.”  In any event, the refusal to engage class-based equality 
theory at every opportunity now may haunt us if we decide to press a 
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more expansive rights campaign in the future. 
Tebbe and Widiss’s argument also privileges marriage without 
regard to equality because it purports to craft a way of accessing 
marriage without asking judges (and the general public) to engage 
directly the class- and caste-based theory of straight dominance or the 
reality of Gay life lived under this dominance.  Thus, those Gays who 
are most likely to benefit from an equal access argument are the few 
Gays who already live in relative social and legal security. Litigating in 
order to gain access to a word—“marriage” as a term—as opposed to 
the bundle of rights associated with state subsidized coupling (which 
is what was at stake in the California cases since Gay couples already 
had the rights) is the indulgence of litigants who have already escaped 
the caste system to some degree.  See In Re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 
384, 397-98 (Cal. 2008) superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. 
CONST. art 1, § 7.5 (noting that California’s domestic partnership 
legislation “affords . . . virtually all of the same substantive legal 
benefits and privileges . . . that California law affords to . . . a married 
couple”).  A focus on accessing marriage in this way means that one 
takes public, straight acknowledgment of a relationship between Gay 
people as an affirmation, not a threat; and that worldview classifies 
one, in Gay terms, as part of the privileged few.  The politics that 
benefits from this type of litigation is thus the politics of those at the 
top—those who can afford to fantasize about marriage per se and who 
can afford to devise legal stratagems to get marriage at any and all cost.  
Indeed, they may feel that such stratagems are highly desirable.  I don’t. 
No movement for real social change can be successful if it is not 
based on empowering the most powerless.  I’m worried about the 
many Gay Americans who cannot yet afford to daydream about 
marriage and its romance because they can’t even be out on an 
individual basis—let alone as a couple—because they fear reprisal at 
work, worry about being rejected by their families, or dread being 
stalked by the law.  For these Gays, any legal argument that purports 
to show the route to victory without squarely confronting the 
monstrous legal caste system in this country (a system largely 
buttressed by formal conceptions of equality and based on class 
distinctions justified as such) is, in a word, dangerous.  An argument 
that gives conservative judges (usually code-worded as “moderates”) 
an opportunity to afford some few Gays some rights piecemeal may 
well be taken by these same judges to the long-term detriment of Gays 
who have less security and who generally ask for less in terms of equal 
rights.  Tebbe and Widiss’s argument, admittedly, provides judges with 
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just such an opportunity; indeed, they believe this is one of their 
argument’s greatest strengths. 
In sum, Tebbe and Widiss’s equal access strategy is simply an 
unsettling continuation of the Gay movement’s rush to marriage over 
the increasingly marginalized warnings of Gay liberationists.**  See 
generally Ettelbrick, supra.  In keeping with the endgame of this 
heteronormative project, equal access gives courts a way to rule in 
favor of marriage without facing equality in any material way.  Thus, 
while, as I said, some Gay advocates might find it fruitful to listen to 
Tebbe and Widiss, I hope they won’t. 
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** As for the unlikely outcome that Tebbe and Widiss say their scholarship 
supports—that states could abolish marriage—I certainly wouldn’t get in the way of 
trying.   
 
